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ABSTRACT
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I examine the relationship between hedging and
diversification effects on CEO compensation in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry.
The REIT industry is suitable for this investigation for various reasons; primarily being that the
REIT sample represents a relatively clean sample to study the effects of diversification and
hedging on compensations. I find a positive and significant relationship between the interaction
variable which reflects the effects of both hedging and diversification and CEO pay-forperformance sensitivity. This is consistent with the notion that managers are in a better position
to manage firm risk if they use all the available tools and instruments, including hedging and
diversification. I also find a positive and significant relationship between hedging and CEO payfor-performance sensitivity, indicating that CEO compensation is more short term oriented
because hedging is a relatively short term risk reduction strategy.
The second chapter of this dissertation examines the relative contribution of regular and
e-mini futures market to price discovery of EUR/USD futures contracts on the CME, using
intraday data in 2010. The relative contribution to price discovery is estimated using the
information share approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995).
Empirical findings indicate that regular futures market accounts for approximately 66.5% of
price discovery in the EURO/USD market. This study also examines if the regular future’s
information share (IS) can be explained by the positioning of commercial and non-commercial
traders. The results support the conclusion that the IS of regular futures can be better explained
by non-commercial traders (speculators) than commercial traders (hedgers).

Key words: Compensation, diversification, hedging, interaction, Informativeness, trader type,
REI

vii

Chapter 1: How is Executive Compensation Related to Hedging and Diversification? The
Case of REITS

1.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I examine the relationship between hedging and diversification effects on
CEO compensation in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. Because both
diversification and hedging can be used to control risk, it is safe to say that they are substitutes to
some extent as a tool to control risk. Managers are in a better position to manage firm risk if they
use all the available tools and instruments, including hedging and diversification. Hence CEOs
should receive compensation based on the general risk level of the firm which is better reflected
by both diversification and hedging. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no study
that simultaneously examines compensation, hedging and diversification.

More specifically, I examine how CEO compensation (CEO pay-for-performance
sensitivity) is related to hedging, diversification and the interaction between hedging and
diversification. I expect that compensation to be significantly related to the interaction between
hedging and diversification. I also expect differential impacts of hedging and diversification on
compensation. If compensation is more long term (short term) oriented, then diversification
(hedging) should be more significantly related to compensation because diversification (hedging)
is a relatively long term (short term) risk reduction strategy.

Previous studies by Williamson (1971), Lewellen (1971), Myers and Majluf (1984),
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Stulz (1990), Gibbson and Murphy (1992), Paul (1992),
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Lemmon and Wang (1996) and others find mixed results concerning the relation between
compensation and diversification. Regarding hedging, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Tufano (1996),
Schrand and Unal (1998), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Core and Guay (2002), Allayannis
and Ofek (2001), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Rogers (2002) examine the relationship between
compensation and hedging and find no conclusive results. This study may provide better
understanding of the relationship between compensation and overall risk of the firm by
examining the relationship between compensation to both hedging and diversification and their
interaction.

It can be argued that the above analysis between compensation and general risk level of a
firm can apply to all the industries. Hence, I limit my analysis to Real Estate Investment Trust
(REIT) industry as it is a relatively cleaner sample due to the following reasons. First, REITs do
not pay corporate taxes, hence the tax motivations is irrelevant for this industry. Second, a
maximum of 25% of its income can come from short-term capital gains and speculative
activities, thus limiting the use of derivatives as a speculating instrument. The probability of the
use of derivative instruments for speculative purposes cannot be ignored. Bodnar et al. (1995)
found that 34% of derivative users used them for speculation. Ljungqvist (1994) inferred that
managers with private information will indulge in speculation. Geczy et al. (2007) found a
substantial number of firms that use derivatives for speculation. Third, Horng and Wei (1999)
found that 41% of REITs in their sample use derivatives, most of which are interest rate swaps.
Mian (1996) found that many industries use interest rate, currency and commodity derivatives
simultaneously. If there are different motivations for interest rate derivatives and other
derivatives, then the results might be ambiguous. Focusing on one industry also allows us to
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include more detailed data of smaller firms. Fifth, REIT industry is relatively more homogenous
than other industries and can only diversify by regions or by sectors. In sum, REITs sample
represents a relatively clean sample to study the effects of diversification and hedging on
compensation.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on firm hedging, firm
focus and CEO compensation. Section 3 details data sources and econometric methodology
employed. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 provides robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes the analysis.
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2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, I summarize major theories of compensation, diversification and hedging
and highlight their implications that are relevant to this discussion. I also document some
empirical evidence.

2.1 Literature Review on Compensation and Diversification

Early seminal works by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979) demonstrate
that there exist a tradeoff between providing incentives and optimal risk sharing for CEOs and
shareholders. They conclude that managers make decisions that increase their own utility at the
cost of decrease in the value of the firm because managers are not full residual claimants. This
means that there exist principal agent problem where shareholders try to link CEO compensation
to firm performance. CEOs make diversification decisions that maximize their private benefits.

Additional evidence given by Williamson (1971), Lewellen (1971), Myers and Majluf
(1984), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Stulz (1990) conclude that diversification increases
firm value which in turn increases shareholder value. In addition, there is evidence that suggest
that CEOs derive private benefits from diversification.

One type of private benefit that the CEO may derive from diversification, according to
Gibbson and Murphy (1992) is that diversification may improve CEOs future career prospects.
They find that CEOs who run more diversified firms are paid more. Their experience in running
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a diversified firm increases their value perception in the labor market. This value perception is
important for CEOs who would like to move to bigger firms. CEOs who value perception have
more stake in diversifying the firm. Similarly, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) conclude that
managers diversify to increase benefit from power and prestige that comes with the increased
firm size. They infer that CEOs may be worried about their social status and managing a larger
more diverse firm may give them a respectable position in society. Roll (1986) introduced the
concept of hubris where over time manager‟s start to believe more in their capabilities and in
turn indulge in firm diversification. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that managers can diversify
to reduce the risk of their undiversifiable human capital.

Private benefits of CEO also depend on his capabilities and the resources at his disposal.
The rational here is demand for managerial input at CEO level is likely to increase with the
amount of extra load that comes with diversification. Finkelstin and Hambrick (1989) conclude
that diversification may increase the complexity of CEOs job. Hence CEO of a firm with
multiple lines of business must evaluate competitive strategies for product lines that may have
different customers, industry structures and competitors. Managing diverse lines of business may
require deploying a broad variety of resources and capabilities. This implies positive relationship
between compensation and diversification and between changes in compensation and changes in
diversification.

Other reasons for justifying diversification can be found in rent seeking and managerial
entrenchment models. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) propose
that managers would prefer to run more diversified firms because of the higher pay that is
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associated with managing a more diversified firm and because of the benefits derived from
“skimming” in the diversified firm. They conclude that if managers can siphon-off firm
resources, their private benefits increases.

Another related source of private benefit is entrenchment. According to Shleifer and
Vishny (1989), who introduced managerial entrenchment theory, diversifying the firm may
entrench mangers, making it costly for the firm to replace them. Hence if the managers feel that
their position in the firm is not secure, they diversify more. So if diversification allows managers
to become more entrenched, managers in the diversified firms will have more power to set their
compensation. If the manager‟s managerial skill is the main source of link between
diversification and compensation, incumbent manager‟s who diversify should be rewarded with
higher compensation.

To sum up, all the above mentioned theories on the relationship between private benefit
and firm diversification conclude that there exists a positive relationship between firm
diversification and increase in private benefits to the CEOs.

On the other hand, in the study of private benefits, executive compensation can be viewed
as a partial remedy to the agency problem. Termed as optimal contracting theory, the board
designs the compensation package to provide CEOs with incentives that maximizes shareholders
value. Paul (1992) and Lemmon and Wang (1996) demonstrate that when the manger is required
to allocate effort within a diversified firm, the optimal compensation contract cannot rely on the
firm‟s stock price to provide proper incentives for principal-agent problem. Using this principal
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agent framework, Paul (1992) demonstrates that in case of stock based compensation, managers
will allocate more effort to project whose cash flows have high variability relative to projects
whose cash flows have low variability. This behavior is because projects having higher
variability have a more chance of being profitable which in turn increases the managers stock
based compensation. Lemmon and Wang (1996) conclude that if managers in diverse firms are
required to pursue a boarder set of activities, then the sensitivity of CEO compensation to the
firm stock price should be negatively related to the extent of diversification. They argue that in
diverse firms, managers cannot focus on the core activities of the firm which may have a
negative impact on the stock price performance. In summary, under optimal contracting theory,
there exists negative relationship between stock based compensation and diversification.

Other diversification literature by Finkelstein and Hambric (1989), Bodnar et al. (1998),
Gomez-Mejia and Palich (1997), Bartlett and Goshal (1989), Bartov et al. (1996), Reeb et al.
(1998), He and Ng (1998), Errunza and Senbet (1984), Morck and Yeung (1991), and Gaver and
Gaver (1993) talk about CEO compensation and geographic diversification. These geographic
diversification arguments prove four testable hypothesis visa vie. (1) CEOs total compensation
varies directly with geographical diversification. (2) Incentive compensation (pay-forperformance) varies directly with geographic compensation. (3) Use of market based rather than
accounting based performance measures in CEO compensation for geographic diversification.
(4) Marginal geographic diversification varies directly with marginal CEO compensation.

In contrast to the above empirical evidence, Servaes (1996) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin
(1997) find evidence of less diversification in firms with higher managerial equity ownership.
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They attribute their findings to agency conflicts in a diversified firm. Related empirical literature
on negative relationship between stock based compensation and diversification include Anderson
et al (2000) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) which is consistent with the agency cost theory.
Anderson et al (2000) analyzed a sample of 199 firms from the year 1985 to 1994 and conclude
that sensitivity of total CEO pay to stock price performance is negatively related to the measures
of firm diversification. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) use data on managerial incentives from
Standard and Poor‟s ExecuComp data set and find that firm performance is increasing in
incentives and decreasing in diversification.

2.2 Literature Review on Compensation and Firm Risk

There exists a complex relationship between compensation and firm risk management.
Manager‟s portfolio structure is considered as a strong determinant of the corporate risk
management choices. There are two theoretical studies that lay out the groundwork to examine
the relationship between risk management and CEO compensation given by Stulz (1984) and
Smith and Stulz (1985).

Stulz (1984) based his model on the hedging policy of the risk-averse manager in perfect
markets. Since the manager maximizes his expected utility over his lifetime, the model assumes
that a compensation contract has been agreed on and that the contract aligns managerial
incentives with those of the shareholders. Because of the assumption that markets are perfect,
shareholders are indifferent about hedging risk. Since fluctuations in the underlying commodity
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value increases the volatility of firm value, managers risk aversion leads to hedge because his
compensation is a function of the firm value.

Smith and Stulz (1985) proposed that shareholders can affect managers risk aversion
decision making by compensation contract. Since manager‟s utility function is concave in
expected wealth, shareholders can structure the compensation contract in such a way as to
counteract the effects of risk aversion. They infer that compensation can be structured as a
convex, concave or linear function of firm value where liner and concave compensation contract
forces manager‟s utility function to be concave. So if the utility is concave in firm value, then
manager possesses utility maximizing incentives to reduce risk. To sum up, they find that
managers can be induced to risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking behavior depending on the
convexity of the contract.

Among empirical evidence showcasing relationship between compensation and risk
management, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find a strong positive correlation between firm percent
return variance and compensation for a sample of 511 firms. In contrast, Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) find a strong empirical confirmation of principal agent model and conclude that executive
pay-for-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of firm‟s performance. But Core
and Guay (2002) are of the view that the expected dollar return variance used by Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999) as the proxy of risk is incorrect as dollar return variance is a noisy measure of
firm size. In a model of CEO incentives taken from ExecuComp database from 1992 to 1996 that
includes market value and risk as separate explanatory variables, Core and Guay (2002) find
percentage return variance is positively related to compensation.
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Schrand and Unal (1998) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) examine if executive stock
option provides managers with an incentive to invest in risky projects and find evidence that
there is a positive relationship between the two. Schrand and Unal (1998) examine relationship
between risk management and managerial security holdings. They find that firms with managers
who are granted options have higher return than the managers who receive no options. This
implies that either managers who are given options micromanage their portfolio or invest in risky
projects. Similarly, for a sample of oil and gas producers for the period 1992 to 1997, Rajgopal
and Shevlin (2002) examine if the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration
increases with the sensitivity of the value of the CEOs options of return volatility. Overall, their
results are consistent with employee stock options providing managers with incentives to
mitigate risk related incentive problems.

In addition, Tufano (1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), Haushalter (2000),
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Rogers (2002) all study the relationship between managerial
incentive and firm risk management but fail to find any significant evidence of managerial
motives determining risk management.

This study concentrates on the REIT industry. There are basically three types of REITs,
equity, mortgage and hybrid REIT. Equity REITs mainly invest in real properties such as
shopping malls, apartments and commercial buildings. Mortgage REITs invest in mortgage
securities. Equity REITs use derivatives mainly to hedge financing costs, while mortgage REITs
use hedging to provide better maturity matching as they have gaps between durations of assets
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and liabilities. Hybrid REITs are a mixture of the equity REIT and the mortgage REIT and also
accounts for a small percentage of REITs. These hybrids combine the mortgage investment of
one with the property management of the other. Congress created REITs in the U.S. in 1960 as a
way to make investments in large-scale, income-producing real estate accessible to all investors
in the same way they typically invest otherwise – through the purchase and sale of liquid
securities. Over half a century, the US real estate investment trust (REIT) industry has become
an important segment of the US economy and investment markets. US REITs have seen their
equity market capitalization soar from $90 billion to roughly $200 billion in just the past 10
years (www.reit.com).
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3. VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY

CEO compensation, measured by pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), is the dependent
variable and diversification, hedging and the interaction between diversification and hedging are
independent variables. The CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is defined as a dollar change in
CEOs wealth for a given dollar change in shareholders wealth, proposed by Jensen and Murphy
(1990) and later used by Hall and Liebman (1998) and Core and Guay (1999, 2002). CEO wealth
includes bonuses, restricted stock awards, stock awards and all other compensation (short term
and long term) excluding salary

Two alternative measurements of diversification are used visa vie Herfindahl indices for
property type and geographic locations. The variable diversification (DIV) is defined as type *
region, an interaction variable between focus/type and focus/region. The variable focus/type, is
computed as the sum of the proportion of a firms assets invested in each of four real estate types
namely office, warehouse, retail and multifamily usage. Higher levels of concentration by
property type will lead to higher level of index. This index is 1 if the firm is focused along one
dimension and is 0.25 if the firm‟s portfolio of properties is equally distributed across all four
property types. The variable focus/region is computed the same way as focus/type, but here we
take the proportion of firms assets invested in each of eight real estate regions; New England,
Middle Atlantic, Southeast, Midwest, Mountains, Southwest, South Pacific and North Pacific.
The concentration variable can vary from one for a geographically focused REIT to 0.125 for
REIT with holdings equally divided across regions. The variable hedge is the dollar amount of
interest rate hedge undertaken by the REIT.
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. One of the main hypotheses that I test in this paper is that the coefficient of the
interaction variable is positive and significant. The interaction variable is a dummy variable,
which takes the value of one when a firm uses both hedging and diversification as means to
control overall firm risk and 0 otherwise. This study can potentially provide a clear picture of
how compensation is related to risk management in a broader sense and a better understanding
among compensation, diversification and hedging can be achieved. By examining diversification
and hedging, both risk reduction techniques, the study might help to clarify how risk control
affects compensation. If compensation is more long term (short term) oriented, then
diversification (hedging) should be more significantly related to compensation because
diversification (hedging) is a relatively long term (short term) risk reduction strategy. The data
for hedging, diversification and interaction variable between hedging and diversification (IV) is
from Security and Exchange Commission‟s (SEC) EDGAR database.

The control variables are divided into groups namely agency cost (M/B, SELF and INST)
firm size (SZ), leverage (DEBT and RATING), liquidity (CASH and SUBS) and CEO
characteristics (age and tenure). All the above control variables are commonly used in the CEO
and executive compensation literature. I obtain the REIT type data from National Association of
Real Estate Investment trusts. CEO age, tenure and institution holding (INST) data is from
SEC‟s EDGAR database (DEF 14A) and define logarithm of the square of returns as a proxy for
volatility. All the other control variable data is from COMPUSTAT. Table 1 summarizes and
defines all the variables.
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TABLE 1: Definition of Variables
Variable
Dependent Variable
Pay-for-performance
Sensitivity (PPS)

Independent
Variables
DIV

Variable Description
$ change in CEO executive compensation for a $
change in shareholder wealth

Diversification = Focus/Type * Focus/Region where,
Focus/Type is the sum of squares of proportion of a
firm‟s assets invested in each of four real estate types:
office, warehouse, retail, or Multi-family usage.

Source
www.sec.com
Financial
Reports
DEF 14A

www.sec.com
Financial
Reports 10K

Focus/Region is the sum of squares of proportion of
firm‟s assets invested in each of eight real estate
regions: New England, Middle Atlantic, Southeast,
Midwest, Mountains, Southwest, South Pacific, and
North Pacific.
HEDGE

IV

$ amount of interest rate hedge

Interaction Variable. A dummy variable equal to 1 if
REIT exercise in both hedging and diversification and 0

www.sec.com
Financial
Reports 10K
www.sec.com
Financial
Reports 10K

Control Variables
Volatility
Agency Costs
M/B
SELF
INST

Stock returns square

CRSP

Market value of assets/Book value of assets
A dummy variable: 1 for self-administered REITs
Proportion of shares held by institutions

14

COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT
www.sec.com
Financial
Reports 10K

TABLE 1: CONTINUED
Firm Size
SZ

The log of market value of assets

COMPUSTAT

Leverage
DEBT
COV
RATING

Book value of debt
Pre-tax income/interest
A dummy variable: 1 if bond rating is BBB or better

COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT

CEO Characteristics
AGE
CEO age
TENURE
CEO tenure

www.sec.com
Financial Reports
DEF 14A

Substitutes/Liquidity
CASH
Cash Balance/market value of assets
SUBS
Value of preferred stock and convertible bonds
Over Market value of assets
REIT Type
TYPE

A dummy variable: 1 for Equity REIT, 0 otherwise
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COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT

www.nareit.com

Most existing compensation literature uses the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
to estimate the impact on pay-for-performance sensitivity. To account for outliers and to control
for heteroskedasticity, median OLS and robust OLS techniques are used. Further, to control for
firm specific effects, fixed/random effects regression is used to analyze the relationship 1 . The
following is the regression function that I test in this paper. All the variables are time varying.

CEOppst     1 Hedget   2 Diversification t   3 Interactio nVariable t   4 SELFt   5 M / Bt 

 6 ln( SIZE) t   7 DEBTt   8 COVt   9 CASH t   10 SUBS t   11 RATING t   12 CEOaget 
 13 CEOtenuret   14 Instt   15 log( returns) 2 t   t

The sample consists of 155 REITs in 2005, 160 REITs in 2006 and 134 REITs in 2007
included in COMPUSTAT. Real estate performance is dramatically different for the years 2006
and 2007 and the differences can provide additional insights for our analysis. Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics for the entire sample and for each of the two years individually.

Table 2 represents summary statistics of all the dependent and independent variables. The
sensitivity of pay to stock price performance averages 29.48 with a median value of 22.19. The
mean (median) PPS for 2006 is 20.02 (18.58) and for 2007 is 34.65 (32.68), indicating that the
CEO compensation is more sensitive to the overall firm performance in 2007. The mean
(median) diversification for the entire sample is 0.38% (0.28%). This mean (median) is 0.40%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1

Median regression, used by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), minimizes the sum of absolute deviations instead of the sum of squared deviations
so that the precise value of the dependent variable in a median regression matters only in determining whether the observation has a positive or
negative residual. If the residual is positive or negative, the dependent variable can increase toward infinity (minus infinity) without affecting the
estimated parameters. Koenker and Bassett (1982) discuss the properties of median regression. Hall and Liebman (1998) use robust regression to
perform an initial screening based on regression results and eliminate gross outliers, and they use the remaining observations and an iterative
method that minimizes a weighted sum of squared errors to perform regression. For details on robust regression, see Street et al. (1988)
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TABLE 2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of all the dependent and independent variables. The sample includes 448 REIT’s, 155 in 2005,
159 in 2006 and 134 in 2007 and describes mean, median standard deviation and number of observations. Statistics are reported for
CASH defined as cash balance/market value of assets, CEO age, CEO compensation in USD, CEO tenure, DEBT defined as book
value of debt/market value of assets, diversification defined as an interaction variable between focus/type and focus/region, INST
defined as institutional holdings, amount of interest rate hedge in USD, M/B defined as market value of assets/Book value of assets,
Pay for Performance defined as $ change in executive wealth for 1% change in stock price, COV defined as per tax income/interest, R
is the returns, SZ defined as log of market value of assets and SUBS defined as value of preferred stock and convertible bonds/market
value of assets.

2005

2006

2007

Category

Obs

Mean

Median

S.D.

Obs

Mean

Median

S.D.

Obs

Mean

Median

S.D.

CASH

155

45.43

8.79

93.11

159

45.36

9.34

92.71

134

68.39

17.28

182.57

CEO Age

155

50.33

50.45

15.14

159

51.39

51

14.74

134

52.14

53

16.53

CEO Compensation ($)

155

1746479

1264534

1804013

159

1784891

1298125

1804012

134

2505814

1835824

3690565

CEO Tenure

155

18.55

3.45

8.97

159

18.78

4

8.57

134

7.67

5

7.1

DEBT

155

0.51

-0.06

0.62

159

0.52

0.49

0.22

134

0.57

0.57

0.25

Diversification

155

0.41

-0.26

0.68

159

0.4

0.29

0.28

134

0.35

0.27

0.25

INST

155

0.2

-0.35

0.58

159

0.21

0.2

0.18

134

20.57

0.25

235.04

Interest Rate Hedge ($)

155

110038

876

481868

159

105345

877

481868

134

79459

0

163019

M/B

155

1.32

0.62

0.72

159

1.26

1.17

0.32

134

1.28

1.12

1.38

Pay for Performance (PPS)

155

21.44

18.03

2.13

159

20.02

18.58

1.73

134

34.65

32.68

1.93

COV

155

2.31

0.17

8.77

159

2.34

0.72

8.37

134

3.7

0.59

22.85

R

155

0.3

-0.28

0.64

159

0.31

0.27

0.24

134

0.31

0.32

0.16

SZ

155

3.2

2.7

0.99

159

3.25

3.25

0.59

134

3.17

3.3

0.8

SUBS

155

0.02

-0.55

0.46

159

0.01

0

0.06

134

0.01

0

0.02
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(0.29%) in 2006 and 0.35% (0.27%) in 2007 clearly indicating a drop in diversification level in
property types or in geographic locations or both. The mean (median) for the amount of interest
rate hedge for the overall sample is $93.5 million ($15.24 million), indicating a highly skewed
distribution. This variable has a mean (median) of $105.3 million ($25.8 million) in 2006 and
$79.5 million (0) in 2007, indicating a drop in dollar amount of interest rate hedge from 2006.
Also, there is an increase in the CASH variable from the mean (median) of 45.36 (9.34) in 2006
to 68.39 (17.28) in 2007 which also indicates that during this period, the REITs on an average
retrained more cash in hand.

Table 3 reports correlation among all the independent variables. The table indicates that
firm size (SZ) and DEBT are highly correlated to some of the other independent variables. As a
robustness check, all the regression models employ two regression analyses: one including size
and debt and other excluding the two variables.
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TABLE 3: Correlation among independent variables
The sample includes total 293 REIT’s, 159 in 2006 and 134 in 2007.
Hedge
($)

SELF

M/B

SZ

DEBT

COV

CASH

SUBS

RATING

CEO
AGE

CEO

INST

R^2

DIV

IV

TENURE
SELF

-0.02

M/B

-0.01

0.05

SZ

0.09

-0.02

0.00

DEBT

0.11*

-0.02

-0.27*

0.18***

COV

-0.03

-0.09

-0.01

-0.20***

-0.32***

CASH

0.03

-0.10*

0.00

0.35***

0.07

-0.02

SUBS

-0.01

-0.02

-0.04

-0.05

0.08

-0.02

-0.02

RATING

0.02

-0.08

-0.05

0.03

0.15***

-0.06

0.01

-0.05

CEO AGE

0.01

0.12**

0.05

-0.03

-0.04

0.04

0.04

-0.04

-0.12**

CEO TENURE

-0.02

-0.05

0.02

-0.08

-0.12**

0.05

-0.02

-0.01

-0.03

0.06

INST

-0.01

-0.06

-0.01

-0.01

0.02

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.03

-0.01

0.00

R^2

-0.07

-0.03

0.01

0.08

0.00

0.02

0.05

-0.07

-0.08

0.06

0.03

0.05

DIV

-0.04

0.07

-0.06

-0.14*

0.16***

-0.01

-0.01

0.07

-0.01

0.03

0.13**

-0.02

-0.07

IV

0.26***

0.06

0.08

0.06

0.02

-0.05

-0.11*

0.08

0.02

0.03

-0.06

0.06

0.01

0.11*

COMP

0.06

0.03

0.01

0.20***

-0.07

-0.06

0.14**

-0.03

-0.02

0.10*

-0.04

0.06

0.00

0.00

Note.—See appendix A for definition of variables.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** represents 5% level and * represents 10% level of significance
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0.03

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In Table 4, I employ several specifications of regressions of our measures of PPS on our
measure of diversification, hedging, interaction variable between diversification and hedging and
control variables. I employ OLS regression with control variables, median regression to account
for outliers and OLS robust regression to control for heteroskedasticity. Since panel data is used
in this analysis, I conduct Hausman test (Housman, 1978) and fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the unique ( u i ) errors are not correlated with the regressors. Hence the preferred model is
random effect. I also conduct Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, where I reject the
null hypothesis that variances across entities is zero. There are significant differences across
units (i.e. panel effect). Finally to control for heteroskedasticity in panel data, I run robust
random effect regression.

Consistent with my hypothesis, Table 4 shows a positive and significant coefficient (at
5%) for the interaction variable that measures the effect of both the risk management tools
namely hedging and diversification for all regression specifications. When firm size and debt are
included, the magnitude of the interaction variable indicates that if CEO uses both hedging and
diversification as a tool to control risk, it increases the sensitivity of pay-for-performance by
0.575, which is 2.59% of the sample median value of total pay-for-performance sensitivity
(22.19) for the robust random effects model. This magnitude is 0.576, 0.565 and 0.576
representing 2.60%, 2.55% and 2.60% of sample median for OLS with control variables, median
OLS and robust OLS regressions. This lends some support to the notion that the CEOs
compensation (here, pay-for-performance sensitivity) is positively and significantly related to the
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TABLE 4: Regression Results of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification,
hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt

CEOppst     1 Hedget   2 Diversification t   3 Interactio nVariable t   4 SELFt   5 M / Bt 

 6 ln( SIZE) t   7 DEBTt   8 COVt   9 CASH t   10 SUBS t   11 RATING t   12 CEOaget 
 13 CEOtenuret   14 Instt   15 log( returns) 2 t   t
The table represents regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging,
interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. Four regressions are reported:
ordinary least squares (OLS), median, robust, and random effect. p values are reported in
parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the OLS and random
effects regression. The goodness-of-fit measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared
(OLS, robust, and instrumental variable regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median
regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Variable
PPS

Regression Method
Median

Robust

-0.432***

-0.465***

-0.432***

-0.464***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.696*

1.135*

1.696*

1.736*

(0.089)

(0.094)

(0.085)

(0.083)

0.478

0.585

0.478

0.536

(0.179)

(0.182)

(0.345)

(0.764)

0.576**

0.565**

0.576**

0.453**

(0.045)

(0.012)

(0.045)

(0.040)

-0.038**

-0.124

-0.038**

-0.132**

(0.035)

(0.361)

(0.016)

(0.021)

M/B

-0.002**

-0.001*

-0.002*

-0.032*

(0.062)

(0.056)

(0.082)

(0.100)

Ln(Size)

-0.025**

-0.034

-0.025

-0.152

(0.011)

(0.145)

(0.209)

(0.253)

0.011

1.457

0.011

0.521

(0.221)

(0.457)

(0.567)

(0.733)

0.022

-0.032

-0.022

-0.053

(0.963)

(0.400)

(0.732)

(0.782)

1.547*

2.764

1.547

1.632

(0.085)

(0.145)

(0.373)

(0.367)

-0.206

-0.083

-0.206**

-0.367*

(0.132)

(0.426)

(0.031)

(0.060)

-0.016

-0.030

-0.016

-0.162

(0.373)

(0.189)

(0.484)

(0.428)

0.243

0.346

0.243

-0.117

(0.490)

(0.205)

(0.546)

(0.645)

INTERCEPT
ln(Hedge)
DIV
IV
SELF

DEBT
COV
CASH
SUBS
RATING
CEO Age

OLS
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Random Effect

TABLE 4: CONTINUED

22

general risk level of the firm, which is better reflected by both diversification and hedging among
REIT firms.

Consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Schrand and Unal (1998),
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Core and Guay (2002), I find a positive and significant (at
10%) relationship between hedging and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. When firm size
and debt are included, an increase in the dollar amount of interest rate hedge increases the payfor-performance sensitivity by an average of 0.01736 for the robust random effects model. This
PPS is 0.01696, 0.01135 and 0.01696 for OLS with controls, median OLS and robust OLS
regressions. Also consistent with the findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Holmstrom
(1979), Williamson (1971), Lewellen (1971), Myers and Majluf (1984), Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1987), Stulz (1990) and others, there is a positive relationship between CEO pay-forperformance sensitivity and diversification. But this coefficient is insignificant for all the
regressions indicating that CEO compensation is more short term oriented, as hedging is more
significantly related to CEO compensation because hedging is a relatively short term risk
reduction strategy.

Table 5 excludes two variables size (SZ) and debt (DEBT). The results indicate a positive
significant relationship (at 10%) between the interaction variable and CEO pay-for-performance
sensitivity. I also find a positive and significant (at 10%) relationship between hedging and CEO
pay-for-performance sensitivity. Consistent with Table 4, the coefficient of diversification is
positive but insignificant for all the regressions indicating that CEO compensation is more short
term oriented.
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TABLE 5: Regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging,
interaction variable and control variables excluding size (SZ) and DEBT
The table represents regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on diversification, hedging,
interaction variable and control variables excluding size (SZ) and DEBT. Four regressions are
reported: ordinary least squares (OLS), median, robust, and random effect. p values are reported
in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the OLS and random
effects regression. The goodness-of-fit measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared
(OLS, robust, and instrumental variable regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median
regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Variable

Regression Method

PPS

OLS

INTERCEPT
ln(Hedge)
DIV
IV
SELF
M/B
COV
CASH
SUBS
RATING
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Institutional Holdings
Ln(Returns^2)

Sample Size
2

Adjusted R /pseudo R

2

Median OLS

Robust OLS

-0.478***

-0.708***

-0.478***

-0.477***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

1.776*

0.197*

1.776*

2.136*

(0.099)

(0.070)

(0.065)

(0.063)

0.131

0.172

0.131

0.130

(0.304)

(0.382)

(0.362)

(0.420)

0.276*

0.249*

0.276*

0.277*

(0.057)

(0.059)

(0.058)

(0.057)

-0.038**

-0.017**

-0.038**

-0.038**

(0.019)

(0.239)

(0.015)

(0.020)

-0.022

0.001

-0.022

-0.035

(0.796)

(0.055)

(0.590)

(0.811)

-0.155

-0.142

-0.155

-0.153

(0.754)

(0.347)

(0.699)

(0.756)

1.745

0.764

1.745

1.762

(0.785)

(0.733)

(0.414)

(0.450)

-0.198*

-0.111*

-0.198**

-0.194**

(0.082)

(0.057)

(0.040)

(0.042)

0.015

-0.032

-0.015

-0.016

(0.461)

(0.085)

(0.080)

(0.079)

1.333

0.874

1.333

-0.117

(0.816)

(0.376)

(0.346)

(0.645)

-0.938

-0.515

-0.938

-0.522

(0.502)

(0.680)

(0.515)

(0.521)

1.810***

1.321***

1.810**

1.728**

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.016)

(0.015)

0.209***

0.248***

0.209***

0.232***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

448

448

448

448

0.559

0.453

0.579

0.598
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Random Effect

To check if current values of the control variables may suffer from simulataneity, I reestimate the random effects model using lagged values. The results are similar to before.

CEOppst     1 Hedget 1   2 Diversification t 1   3 Interactio nVariable t 1   4 SELFt 1 

 5 M / Bt 1   6 ln( SIZE) t 1   7 DEBTt 1   8 COVt 1   9 CASH t 1   10 SUBS t 1   11 RATINGt 1 
 12 CEOaget 1   13 CEOtenuret 1   14 Instt 1   15 log( returns) 2 t 1  
In the random effects reported in Table 6 for both the regression models, the lag of hedge
and lag of interaction variable are both positively and significantly related to both the PPS values
of 2007 and 2006 at 5% level of significance.

To summarize, I find a positive significant relationship between the interaction variable
and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and conclude that the CEO compensation is more short
term oriented.
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TABLE 6: Regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on lags of diversification,
hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt
The table represents regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on lag values of
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables excluding size (SZ) and
DEBT. Random effect regressions are reported and p values are reported in parentheses.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the random effects regression. The
goodness-of-fit measure reported is the adjusted R-squared. Asterisks indicate significance at 1%
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. The dependent variable in model [1] is PPS values for 2007
and the dependent variable on model [2] is PPS values for 2006. Following is the regression
equation:

CEOppst     1 Hedget 1   2 Diversification t 1   3 Interactio nVariable t 1   4 SELFt 1 

 5 M / Bt 1   6 ln( SIZE) t 1   7 DEBTt 1   8 COVt 1   9 CASH t 1   10 SUBS t 1   11 RATINGt 1 
 12 CEOaget 1   13 CEOtenuret 1   14 Instt 1   15 lg( returns) 2 t 1  
Variable

Dependent Variable

Regression Method
[1]

[2]

PPS 2007

PPS 2006

Random Effect (Robust)

p value

Random Effect (Robust)

p value

INTERCEPT

-0.635***

(0.000)

-0.736***

(0.000)

ln(Hedge) t 1

2.733*

(0.099)

1.736*

(0.076)

DIV t 1

1.725

(0.524)

-0.478

(0.345)

IV t 1

1.456*

(0.065)

2.832*

(0.083)

SELF t 1

2.497

(0.652)

-0.038

(0.726)

M/B t 1

-1.234

(0.721)

-0.002

(0.826)

Ln(Size) t 1

0.424*

(0.074)

-0.025

(0.209)

DEBT t 1

2.257

(0.221)

0.011

(0.567)

COV t 

0.002

(0.963)

-0.022

(0.732)

CASH t 1

1.224

(0.875)

1.547

(0.373)

SUBS t 1

-3.862

(0.487)

-0.206**

(0.031)

RATING t 1

1.398

(0.373)

-0.016

(0.484)

CEO Age t 1

0.497

(0.490)

0.243

(0.546)

CEO Tenure t 1

-0.611

(0.306)

-0.638

(0.528)

Institutional Holdings t 1

2.833*

(0.061)

1.458**

(0.025)

Ln(Returns^2) t 1

3.725***

(0.000)

0.209***

(0.000)

Sample Size
Adjusted R - squared

134

155

0.301

0.356
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5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK

In the above analysis, I used a dummy variable as a proxy for the interaction between
hedging and diversification. Hence I calculate an alternative variable, hedge proposition, which
is the proportion of the dollar value of hedge to the dollar value of total assets. The interaction
variable is now calculated as hedge proportion time‟s diversification.

In the above tables, table 7 presents results of regressions including the size and debt
variables and table 8 excludes size and debt variables. I employ OLS with control variables,
median OLS, robust OLS and robust random effects model. Consistent with the results obtained
from the regression equations using dummy variables for the interaction variables, I find positive
significant (at 10%) relationship between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and the
interaction variable giving precedence to the conclusion that the CEO compensation depends on
how well he manages firm risk by using both hedging and diversification as tools in the REIT
industry. Also consistent with the previous conclusion, I find that there exists a positive
significant relationship (at 1%) between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and hedge
proportion and a positive but not significant relationship between CEO pay-for-performance
sensitivity and diversification. This indicates that CEOs compensation is more short term
oriented because hedging is a relatively short term risk reduction strategy. When analyzing the
relationship between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and the interaction variable, care
must be taken about interpreting the coefficients of hedge proportion and diversification since
marginal effect of one, depends on the value of the other. To better understand the coefficient,
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one can evaluate then at their means; evaluate derivative of CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity
with respect to hedge proportion, at the mean of firm diversification.
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TABLE 7: Robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt.
The table represents robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. I
define a new variable hedge proposition which is the proportion of the dollar value of hedge to
the dollar value of total assets. The interaction variable now is calculated as hedge proportion
times diversification. Four regressions are reported: ordinary least squares (OLS), median,
robust, and random effect. p values are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported for the OLS and random effects regression. The goodness-of-fit
measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared (OLS, robust, and instrumental variable
regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1%
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Variable
PPS
Intercept
Hedge Proportion
DIV
IV
SELF
M/B
Ln(Size)
DEBT
COV
CASH
SUBS
RATING
CEO Age
CEO Tenure

Regression Method
OLS

Median

Robust

Random Effect

-0.432***

-0.382***

-0.432***

-0.536***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.510***

3.942***

2.510***

1.105***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

0.037

0.065**

0.037

0.173

(0.227)

(0.014)

(0.305)

(0.454)

0.332*

0.345*

0.332*

0.931*

(0.081)

(0.072)

(0.075)

(0.089)

-0.037**

-0.018

-0.037**

0.163**

(0.022)

(0.188)

(0.017)

(0.035)

-0.002

-0.001

-0.002

0.034

(0.763)

(0.967)

(0.495)

(0.647)

-0.008

-0.002

-0.008

-0.023

(0.505)

(0.786)

(0.463)

(0.743)

-0.002

-0.003

-0.002

0.017

(0.950)

(0.914)

(0.951)

(0.846)

-0.132

-0.182

-0.132

-0.234

(0.705)

(0.344)

(0.674)

(0.746)

0.547

0.746

0.547

0.847

(0.413)

(0.287)

(0.378)

(0.413)

-0.174

-0.038

-0.174*

-0.145

(0.322)

(0.656)

(0.070)

(0.322)

-0.011

-0.040**

-0.011

0.174

(0.598)

(0.025)

(0.625)

(0.598)

-0.004

0.003

-0.004

-0.024

(0.860)

(0.641)

(0.864)

(0.742)

-0.002

0.007

0.002

0.243
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TABLE 7: CONTINUED
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TABLE 8: Robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables excluding size and debt
The table represents robustness check regression of pay-for-performance sensitivity on
diversification, hedging, interaction variable and control variables including size and debt. I
define a new variable hedge proposition which is the proportion of the dollar value of hedge to
the dollar value of total assets. The interaction variable now is calculated as hedge proportion
times diversification. Four regressions are reported: ordinary least squares (OLS), median,
robust, and random effect. p values are reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported for the OLS and random effects regression. The goodness-of-fit
measures reported are either the adjusted R-squared (OLS, robust, and instrumental variable
regressions) or the pseudo R-squared (median regression). Asterisks indicate significance at 1%
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Variable
PPS
Intercept
Hedge Proportion
DIV
IV
SELF
M/B
COV
CASH
SUBS
RATING
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Institutional Holdings
Ln(Returns^2)

Regression Method
OLS

Median

Robust

Random Effect

-0.517***

-0.839***

-0.517***

-0.487***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

2.464***

3.954***

2.464***

2.510***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.039

0.069*

0.039

0.064

(0.189)

(0.002)

(0.264)

(0.543)

0.321*

0.364*

0.321*

0.631*

(0.100)

(0.092)

(0.094)

(0.083)

-0.037**

-0.016

-0.037**

-0.163**

(0.021)

(0.161)

(0.016)

(0.021)

-0.002

-0.002

-0.002

-0.098

(0.779)

(0.747)

(0.555)

(0.763)

-0.001

-0.002

-0.001

-0.053

(0.809)

(0.702)

(0.781)

(0.983)

0.003

0.004

0.003

0.009

(0.539)

(0.201)

(0.488)

(0.874)

-0.168

-0.035

-0.168*

-0.174

(0.335)

(0.626)

(0.079)

(0.322)

-0.011

-0.035**

-0.011

-0.111

(0.583)

(0.023)

(0.620)

(0.698)

-0.004

-0.005

-0.004

-0.104

(0.940)

(0.530)

(0.643)

(0.860)

-0.002

-0.003

-0.002

0.735

(0.845)

(0.965)

(0.847)

(0.731)

0.002*

0.001***

0.002***

0.008

(0.091)

(0.000)

(0.006)

(0.697)

0.221***

0.281***

0.221***

0.222***
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TABLE 8: CONTINUED
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6. CONCLUSION

This paper generates two important insights regarding the connection between hedging
and diversification on CEO compensation, measured by pay-for-performance sensitivity. First, I
find that there exists a positive and significant relationship between the interaction variable that
measures the effects of both hedging and diversification and CEO pay-for-performance
sensitivity. Second, CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is positive and significantly related to
hedging. Relationship between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and diversification is not
consistent and insignificant.

Using a variety of regression measures, I demonstrate that a robust relationship exists
between CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and the interaction variable between firm hedging
and diversification, indicating that CEO compensation should be based on how well he/she
manages the general risk level of the firm which is better reflected by firm hedging and
diversification. I also demonstrate that there exist a robust relationship between CEO pay-forperformance sensitivity and firm hedging indicating that compensation is more short term
oriented because hedging is a relatively short term risk reduction strategy.
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Chapter 2: The Relative Informativeness of Regular and E-mini EURO/DOLLAR Futures
Contracts and the Role of Trader Types

1. INTRODUCTION

Price discovery is a process by which related markets attempt to incorporate new
information to reach an equilibrium price. It is particularly important to analyze the issue of price
discovery for currency futures because of its relatively large market size in terms of volume.
Currency market is one of the largest, one of the fastest growing and one of the most liquid
financial markets in the world with an average daily turnover of $ 4 trillion in 2010 which is 20%
higher than 2009 numbers. Out of this, 37% represents an increase in the currency futures
market. 1 Within this market, EUR/USD is by far the dominant pair, with a 28% share in the
global currency futures market turnover by currency pair. 2 This absolute dominance over other
currency pairs begs for a more detailed analysis. The Euro currency futures traded on Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) is ranked first out of top twenty foreign exchange futures traded
ranked by the number of contracts. 3 In 2010, 85,370,148 contracts were traded as compared to
53,873,989 contracts in 2009, which makes for a 58.46% increase. Similarly the number of
contracts traded in e-mini EUR/USD futures market increased from 657,689 contracts to
1,237,773 contracts which is an 88.20% jump. 4 This is by far the highest percent volume
increase on CME and makes it one of the most tradable markets in recent years.

1, 2

The data source is “Triennial Central Bank Survey – Report on Global Foreign Exchange Market Activity in 2010” for December 2010 from
www.bis.org.
3

Data
source
is
“Annual
volume
survey
–
2010”
from
http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/Volume-Mar_FI%28R%29.pdf
4

Futures

Industries

Association

(FIA)

web

site

Data source is from “Semi-Annual Foreign Exchange Volume Survey” from the Foreign Exchange Committee (FXC) website
http://www.newyorkfed.org/fxc/news/ and CME monthly volume reports.
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In this paper, I examine the relative contribution of regular and e-mini futures market to
price discovery of EUR/USD futures contracts on the CME. Stated differently, since e-mini
contracts are more likely to be traded by small traders, I attempt to find out the relative
contributions of large and small traders to price discovery and how they react to new information
using the information share (IS) approach proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and
Granger (1995). 5

Moreover, I also examine if the regular future‟s information share (IS) can be
explained by the positioning of commercial traders (hedgers) and non-commercial traders
(speculators). To put it differently, I will examine if trader type in the CME regular futures
market can explain information share. This will provide an insight into the relative importance of
different types of traders visa vie IS and their leadership in generating information. The trader
type classification (commercial vs. non-commercial trader) available with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) trade data allows the study of the effects of proprietary
trading by various types of traders. 6 Categorizing theses traders is important to understand the
role they play in financial markets.

The interpretation of this relationship between the IS and trader type classification can be
used to determine which of the trader type (commercial and non-commercial) reflects higher
degree of private information. Representative studies by Scholes (1972) and Evans and Lyons
5

E-mini trading is associated with higher transaction costs for larger trades. Brokerage commissions are charged on a per contract basis. Hence
even if the bid-ask spread is smaller; the total transaction costs per dollar of trading volume will be higher in the E-mini market. Therefore, the
logical conclusion is that E-mini market will be dominated by small investors and the institutional traders will trade in the lower cost regular
futures markets. (Kurov and Lasser 2004).
6

When an individual reportable trader is identified to the Commission, the trader is classified either as "commercial" or "non-commercial." All
of a trader's reported futures positions in a commodity are classified as commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular
commodity for hedging as defined in CFTC Regulation 1.3(z), 17 CFR 1.3(z).

39

(2002) conclude that there is a positive correlation between order flow and exchange rate
movements. They interpret this as the traders placing the orders have private information. 7

I expect to find large traders in the regular futures market to be better informed than the
small traders in the e-mini futures market. The rational here is, a large body of literature indicates
that the regular futures markets have fewer constraints, higher leverage, lower transaction costs,
and instruments that make it easy to speculate and hedge which makes it an ideal market for
informed investors. These large investors are more likely to be institutional investors with greater
financial, technical and analytical skills. Earlier and recent studies by Ates and Wang (2005), Tse
and Xiang (2005) and Tao and Song (2010) find that index futures market dominate e-mini
market in price discovery. Existing studies by Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), Nofsinger and
Sias (1999), Barber and Odean (2000), Chakravarty (2001), and Malmendier and Shanthikumar
(2007) all analyze trader types and suggest that small traders are mostly individual traders in the
e-mini futures markets that usually have limited capital and are relatively less informed than the
large traders as they lack the technical and analytical skills to make sound financial decisions.

My contributions to the existing literature are twofold. Firstly, to the best of my
knowledge, this is the first attempt that examines the relative contribution of regular and e-mini
futures market to price discovery of EUR/USD futures contracts. This is also the first paper that
compares regular and e-mini contracts in the currency futures market. Studies by Kurov and
Lasser (2004), Ates and Wang (2005), Tse and Xiang (2005) and Tao and Song (2010)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7

Noise traders enhance the market liquidity, but make the information discovery process longer. Kyle (1985), French and Roll (1986) present
evidence that suggests the influence of noise trading is non-trivial.
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analyze price discovery between regular and e-mini index futures market, but no study has
compared regular and e-mini contracts in currency futures market.

Secondly, this is the first paper that analyzes the contribution of trader type to
information share (IS) in the currency markets. This allows for a deeper understanding as to
whether commercial (hedger) or non-commercial (speculator) traders account for a large share of
price discovery in the futures market. Related studies by Klitgaard and Weir (2004) and Gorton,
Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007) ran regression of returns on contemporaneous changes in
speculative trader positions and found evidence of either private information or trend chasing
behavior among speculators, but they do not analyze the information share. Another related
study by Schwarz (2011) concerning the relationship between positioning of hedgers and
speculators and returns in equity future markets find that the revelation of speculative positions
are informative to investors, which supports private information hypothesis. By analyzing the
relationship between hedgers, speculators and information share, I attempt to determine the
relative contributions of different traders to price discovery in financial markets.

The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature
followed by section 3 that describes data and section 4 provides the methodologies and results.
Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
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2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Price Discovery

Previous studies on commodity derivative markets by Garbade and Silber (1982) Khoury
and Yourougou (1991), Schroeder and Goodwin (1991), Schwary and Szakmary (1994),
Brockman and Tse (1995) and Ivanov and Cho (2010) all conclude that there is price leadership
in the regular futures market.

Studies on equity index derivative markets are to the best of the term, inconclusive.
Among studies on non-U.S index markets, Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994), Iihara,
Kato, & Tokunaga (1996), Shyy, Vijayraghavan, and Scott-Quinn (1996), Kofman and Moser
(1997), Breedon and Holland (1998), Kim, Szakmary, and Schwarz (1999), Roope and
Zurbruegg (2002), So and Tse (2004), Tse and Xiang, and Fung (2006) all report that equity
index futures prices lead price discovery more when futures are traded electronically. On the
other hand Massimb and Phelps (1994), Chow, Lee and Shyy (1996), Martens (1998) and Franke
and Hess (2000) find that price discovery is in the open outcry markets. This is because
compared to open outcry markets, electronic systems impose additional costs and risks. It is also
because floor traders can observe the actions of other traders which help them to react. Studies
on price discovery process in the equity index futures in certain U.S. exchanges include
Hasbrouck (2003), Joel (2003), Kurov and Lasser (2004), Ates and Wang (2005), Yiuman et al
(2006), Wang, Chung and Yang (2007). They examine the price discovery process in S & P 500
and Nasdaq 100 index and concluded that e-mini index futures played a dominant role in the
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price discovery process. 8 Information share measuring technique proposed by Hasbrouck (1995)
is used to analyze IS for the equity index futures markets.

Similarly, studies on currency futures markets are not clear. The studies include Crain
and Lee (1995) Martens and Kofman (1998), Chatrath and Song (1998) and Rosenberg and
Traub (2009) all examine the price leadership between regular futures and foreign exchange
(FX) spot market, use Granger causality and conclude that in spite the dominance of spot market
in terms of volume, the foreign exchange futures market play a leading role in price discovery. 9
This may be due to high level of transparency in the futures markets in comparison to the spot
market as suggested by Hasbrouck (2004). On the other hand, Poskitt (2009) and Chen and Gau
(2010) find that regular futures have lower information share than spot. 10 Among studies that
compare three markets simultaneously in currency futures market, Tse, Xiang and Fung (2006)
concluded that relative contribution to price discovery in GLOBEX electronic futures dominates
floor futures and spot trading in the EUR/USD FX market and spot trading dominates futures
trading in the YEN/USD market. Floor trading futures markets contribute the least to the price
discovery for both the currencies, consistent with Theissen (2002) and Hasbrouck (2003) study
on stock markets. But Cabrera, Wang and Yang (2009) conclude that EBS electronic interdealer
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8

Some cited papers analyze the relationship between regular futures, E-mini futures and Exchange traded funds (ETF‟s), while others analyze
the relationship between regular and E-mini futures market.
9

Crain and Lee (1995) Martens and Kofman (1998) examine the price leadership between Regular futures and FX spot market for
Deutschemark (DM)/USD exchange rate. Crain and Lee (1995) examines the impact of 19 monthly announcements using hourly price data from
CME and Martens and Kofman (1998) use the Reuters spot exchange data (all trades FXFX) and futures data from CME for three months from
June to August 1993.Rosenberg and Traub (2009). Rosenberg and Traub (2009) find that, for 3 months in 1996, currency futures markets from
CME for Deutsche Mark, British Pound, Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc have 80% - 90% price discovery when comparing with spot transactions
data from Reuters dealing 2000-1 system. They also report that the spot market leads futures market using spot market quotes from Bloomberg
over the period from March to May 2006. A possible explanation for their result is that “greater transparency is generally associated with more
informative prices” (Madhavan, 2000). A market with low transparency is typically associated with lower degree of price discovery. As pointed
out by Rime (2003), the interdealer direct trading platform by Reuters Dealing 2000-1 has a relatively low level of price transparency. However,
the spot market might have become more transparent over time. Chatrath and Song (1998) investigate the intraday reactions in the yen futures
market and spot market and conclude that volatility spillover is from the futures to spot market for the period January 1992 to December 1995.
10

Poskitt (2009) compared GLOBEX and Reuters D3000 in the electronic sterling/dollar exchange while Chen and Gau (2010) compared CME
and EBS for the EUR/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates.
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spot dominates GLOBEX futures and e-mini futures in price discovery for both EUR/USD and
YEN/USD exchange markets. They conclude that the leadership in spot market is due to the
large size of the interdealer spot market (EBS). Cabrera, Wang and Yang (2009) also suggest
that Tse, Xiang and Fung (2006) find different results for the EUR/USD exchange rate because
the spot platform that they use (CMC) is likely to have uninformed traders.

Studies related to the present paper suggest that regular futures market might play a big
role in price discovery when compared to e-mini futures market. But Kurov and Lasser (2004)
examine price dynamics in the S & P 500 and Nasdaq 100 index futures markets for the period
May to September 2001 find that price discovery takes place in the e-mini futures market visa
vie floor traded regular futures market. They interpret this result to conclude that e-mini markets
still are important “satellite” markets, despite an exemplary growth in this market. On the other
hand, Tse and Xiang (2005), Tse and Xiang (2005) and Tao and Song (2010) both conclude that
the contribution by e-mini market is relatively higher compared to their share of trading volume.
Tao and Song (2010) compared e-mini index futures in Hang Seng Index Futures market
(MHSIF) to standard Hang Seng Index Futures (HSIF) for the year 2005 and concluded that
MHSIF contribute 16.8% to price discovery which is disproportionately high considering the low
volume in MHSIF compared to HSIF. They interpret this result to conclude that MHSIF market
attracts small traders and small informed traders that improve informational efficiency.

In contrast, Ates and Wang (2005) find inconclusive results when they examined price
discovery between floor traded index futures and electronic e-mini index futures in the S & P
500 and Nasdaq 100 markets and find that from September 1997 to August 1998 index futures
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contributed to price discovery. From August 1998 to February 2000 and from February 2000 to
December 2001, they find that e-mini and index futures markets were respectively responsible
for price discovery. But for Nasdaq 100 market, they conclude that e-mini contributed more to
price discovery during the entire period. These results can be used to conclude that e-mini futures
market made larger contributions to price discovery during the period of high volatility.

2.2 Market Microstructure

Microstructure theories usually assume that informed traders are usually insiders who
have private information about the firms. But knowledge of specific security may not be an
important source of information in the futures markets because according to Subrahmanyam
(1991) such information is diversified. But this does not lead to efficient market as some traders
are more efficient in interpreting publically available information or can react faster to the new
information than other traders. Lyons (1995), Yao (1998) and Payne (2003) all use data from
foreign exchange dealers and conclude that spreads contain information component. Hence price
discovery takes place either because some traders are more efficient in interpreting publically
available information or because they react faster to the new information than other traders.
Lately, empirical research by Kurov and Lasser (2004) and Erenburg, Kurov and Lasser (2006)
suggest that exchange locals are more informed than off exchange locals in the e-mini S & P 500
and Nasdaq 100 markets. Using Hasbrouck (1995) methodology, they support the notion that
locals are market makers and are privy to private information.
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Webb and Smith (1994), Wang, Michalski, Jordan and Moriarty (1994) and Ates and
Wang (2005) all conclude that liquidity is one of the components that determine the rate of price
discovery in the foreign exchange futures markets. This implies that traders generating liquidity
in the futures markets lead to price discovery. Cohen and Shin (2003), Danielsson and Love
(2006), using U.S. treasury and spot foreign exchange market data, find evidence of positive
feedback trading (trend chasing). His is because the market is dominated by large traders who
hold considerable inventory. On the other hand Antoniou, Kutmos and Pericli (2005) find no
evidence of positive feedback trading in the index futures markets of six developed nations. They
conclude that this is because rational speculators trading index futures may help stabilize
underlying stock price. Lately, Kurov (2008) examined how the order flow of trades in the index
futures markets is affected by recent price changes and conclude that index futures traders use
positive feedback trading strategies i.e. buy after price increase and sell after price declines.

Literature related to present paper on microstructure includes Klitgaard and Weir (2004)
and Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007) who ran a simple OLS regression of returns on
change in speculative position for currency futures and nonfinancial futures market. They
examine publically available data on the weekly commitments of trader‟s reports published by
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and find a strong relationship between
changes in speculators net positions and changes in exchange rates. They also find that when the
information about speculators commitments of traders is generated in a particular week, an
observer could have a 75% chance of guessing the direction of the exchange rates in that week
correctly. They interpret this as an evidence of either private information or trend chasing
behavior of speculators. Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007) also ran regression of returns
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on speculative levels for nonfinancial firms and interpreted the results as evidence of trend
chasing behavior. Schwarz (2011) study the relationship between positioning of hedgers and
speculators and returns in equity index futures markets and find significant relationship between
position changes and returns. They conclude that when speculators hold long positions in the
futures market, the returns are high. This can be due to private information, liquidity or positive
feedback. By proposing new test for private information hypothesis, Schwarz (2011) concluded
that investors react to announcements of speculator positioning which support private
information hypothesis.
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3.

DATA

Three categories of data is used in this paper i.e. intraday tic GLOBEX EUR/USD futures
data, e-mini futures data from CME and net positions of different types of traders from CFTC
which are reported weekly. The sample period is from January 2010 to December 2010, with a
total of 252 trading days.

3.1

Futures Market Data

The regular futures market data set used in this study is from the best bid or offer (BBO)
one second intraday data of the EURO/USD futures traded on Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME). The EURO/USD futures contract traded on CME has a contract size of €125,000 with a
minimum price fluctuation of $0.00005 per euro increments ($6.25/contract). The electronic
trading is conducted on the CME GLOBEX trading platform and runs from 1700 CST to 1600
CST (Central Standard Time) the next day, Sunday through Friday. The trading is closed at 1600
CST on Fridays and reopened on Sundays at 1700 CST.

CME e-mini euro futures began trading in 1999 on CME GLOBEX. E-mini futures
contracts are half the size of the regular futures contracts to make it affordable to traders with
small margin accounts. The e-mini futures market data set used in this study is from the best bid
or offer (BBO) intraday data of the EURO/USD futures traded on Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME). The EURO/USD futures contract traded on CME has a contract size of €62,500 with a
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minimum price fluctuation of $0.0001 per euro increments ($6.25/contract). The trading time is
the same as that of regular EUR/USD futures.

The filtered data for CME regular futures include 17,123,819 quote observations, while
that for e-mini include 11,854,327 quote observations. The BBO intraday data of CME reports
quoted bid and ask price. I follow Hasbrouck (1995) approach to calculate the trading price,
defined as the average of bid-ask quoted prices. Table 1 reports summary statistics of log of
average bid-ask price quotes of EUR/USD traded on CME for the regular and e-mini futures
markets.
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics of log of average bid-ask price quotes of EUR/USD traded on
CME for the regular and emini futures markets. Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics of
one second futures midquotes of EUR/USD traded on CME for Regular and e-mini futures
markets. Panel B reports correlation coefficient between regular and emini futures data

EUR/USD

Number of Transactions
Mean
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Average number of quotes per
hour

Regular Futures

Emini Futures

17,123,819
0.282
0.045
-0.285
-0.362
6843.912***

11,854,327
0.253
0.045
-0.065
0.423
7988.588***

2054.42

2945.26

Correlation Coefficient between
regular futures and e-mini
futures
Regular Futures

0.919***

Note: *** denotes statistically significant at 1%

The price series in both markets show negative kurtosis, indicating a flat tail. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test indicates that the midquote series in two markets are not normally distributed. During the
one year period covered in the sample, trading activity was significantly higher for regular
futures as compared to e-mini futures. The total number of transactions is higher in regular
futures than e-mini futures. The correlation coefficient indicates that the series are highly
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correlated. Also on average, regular futures have a substantially large number of quotes as
compared to e-mini futures.

3.2 Futures Positioning Data

CFTC was created in 1974 and requires the futures market participants with positions
above a certain level to report open interest on a weekly bases. This prevents collusion and
manipulation in the futures markets. Since 1992, on Friday each week, the positions data
collected on Tuesday of the same week is released. 11 The data includes open interest, reportable
positions, commercial and non-commercial traders, non reportable positions, spreading, changes
in commitments from previous reports, percent of open interest and number of traders. A detailed
explanation of the position data is given in the Appendix.

According to the CFTC, when an individual “Reportable Position” is identified to the
commission, the position is classified as either "commercial" (hedger) or "non-commercial"
(speculator). All of the trader's reported futures positions in a commodity are classified as
commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular commodity for hedging. Mutual
funds and corporate pension funds are examples of some of the types of companies that are
classified as hedgers. Hedgers trade in futures markets to offset their risks form the underlying
instrument. In other words, hedgers buy insurance when they deal in the futures markets. On the
other hand, speculators aim is to profit from the fluctuations in the futures prices by betting on
the exchange rate movements. Commodity trading advisors (CTA), as a group is an example of a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11

The positions data was collected semi-monthly and monthly before the year 1992.
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non-commercial or a speculative trader in the futures market. CFTC also reports third category
of position called “Non-reportable Positions”. The long and short open interest shown as "Nonreportable Positions" is derived by subtracting total long and short "Reportable Positions" from
the total open interest. Accordingly, for "Non-reportable Positions," the number of traders
involved and the commercial/non-commercial classification of each trader are unknown. This
data involves firms who are too small to classify hence are ignored for all practical purposes in
this paper.

The CFTC categorizes commercial traders into a diverse group that includes banks,
hedge funds, mutual funds, corporate pension funds, currency dealers and nonfinancial
corporations. 13 The non-commercial trader forms the more homogenous group which includes
commodity trading advisors who are profit driven. Because speculators tend to destabilize the
market, CFTC keeps a close watch on their activities. Hence even though some traders classified
as hedgers can act as speculators, they have an incentive to be classified as commercial traders.
To ensure that traders are classified with accuracy and consistency, CFTC staff may exercise
judgment in re-classifying a trader if it has additional information about the trader‟s use of the
markets.

Panel A of Table 2 shows the raw average number of long and short contracts for each
trader type for the regular futures contracts. The CFTC does not report the breakdown of trader
type positions for the e-mini futures contracts. The non-commercial traders (speculators) on an
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13

A trader may be classified as a commercial trader in some commodities and as a non-commercial trader in other commodities. A single
trading entity cannot be classified as both a commercial and non-commercial trader in the same commodity. Nonetheless, a multi-functional
organization that has more than one trading entity may have each trading entity classified separately in a commodity. For example, a financial
organization trading in financial futures may have a banking entity whose positions are classified as commercial and have a separate moneymanagement entity whose positions are classified as non-commercial.
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TABLE 2: Summary statistics of Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) positioning data

The table represents summary statistics of CFTC positioning data. Panel A of Table 2 shows the raw average number of long and short
contracts for each trader type for the regular futures contracts. The three columns of Panel B describe the ratio of open interest for
trader type i (commercial, noncommercial, non reporter) relative to total open interest of all contracts.

Panel A
Index
EUR/USD
Regular Futures

Noncommercial
Long
Short
47,226

Commercial
Short

Long

81,826

117,357

80,561

Nonreportable
Long
Short
46,228

Panel B
Ratio of trader type
relative
to total open interest
across types
i

i
qt

Index
EUR/USD
Regular Futures



longt  shortt
j

i
j

 long   short
j
j
t
t

Noncommercial

Commercial

-0.0052

0.0036
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Nonreportable

-0.0004

48,425

average take a net short position. Similarly, the commercial traders (hedgers) on an average take
a net long position. 14

Panel B of Table 2 shows the breakdown of trader type relative to total outstanding
positions. To calculate the net position, I use the normalization method proposed by Schwarz
(2011). The formula to calculate net position is:
i

i
qt

i



longt  shortt
j

i
j

 long   short
j
j
t
t

i

Where, longt and shortt represents trader type

i

with long and short positions at time

t

, and

j

represents time stamp from week 1 to week 52. According to Schwarz (2011), this normalization
will allow for the regression coefficients will have the same interpretation across all the different
types of traders.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14

Hedgers are long 45 weeks out of 52 weeks in 2010, suggesting that they have a tendency to be buyers.
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4.

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

4.1 Information Share Approach

The present study takes the approach of Hasbrouck (1995) to estimate the information share (IS).
15

This measure is based on the vector error correction model (VECM) developed by Engle and

Granger (1987). I generate time series of midquotes for EURO/USD futures and e-mini traded
on CME over the sample period in 2010 by doing the following. In each month, the most
actively traded nearest-to-maturity contract was extracted. Five days prior to its expiration the
next-maturity contract was selected in the sample. The quotes must be two-sided, with a positive
value of bid-ask spread. I form time series of the futures midquotes from 1700 CST to 1600 CST
next day during the period of January 2010 to December 2010. Midquote returns are calculated
from the time series of the prevailing futures mid-quote sampled at one-second and
weekly sampling interval. The unit root test for stationarity of midquote series is performed.
Johansen‟s (1988) method is employed to check whether the regular and e-mini futures on CME
are co-integrated.

The vector error correction model (VECM) is defined as:
Q

Q

q 1

q 1

Preg ,t  a reg ,o   reg ( Preg ,t 1   e min i Pe min i ,t 1 )    q Preg ,t  q  q Pemiin,t  q   reg
Q

Q

q 1

q 1

Pe min i ,t  ae min i ,o   e min i ( Preg ,t 1   e min i Pe min i ,t 1 )    q Pe min i ,t q  q Preg ,t q   e min i ,t
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15

Hasbrouck‟s approach (1995) has been widely used to access information share: Mizrach and Neely (2008), Forte and Peña (2009), Poskitt
(2009), Cabrera, Wang, and Yang (2009), Chen and Gau (2010), and Frjins, Gilbert, and Tourani-Red (2010).
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where Preg ,t and Pe min i ,t are the first log difference of the futures midquotes for regular futures
and e-mini futures on CME, respectively.  e min i is the co-integrated vector between the two
markets such that  reg Preg ,t 1   e min i Pe min i ,t 1 is co-integrated of order 1. Q is the number of lags
in the model based on multivariate Schwarz Bayesian criterion (Schwarz, 1978). The coefficients
of the error correction term  reg and  e min i (adjustment coefficients) indicate the responsiveness
of the midquote series to any deviation from the equilibrium relationship.  reg,t and  e min i ,t are
the residuals that are not autocorrelated.

Hasbrouck (1995) defines the information share of one market as the proportion of the
variance of price innovation attributed to the variance of the innovation in the market of interest.
The contribution of one market to the price discovery process (i.e., share in price discovery) is
defined as:
2
2
 reg
 reg
IS = 2 2
 reg  reg   e2min i e2min i

where the innovations are not correlated and  reg and  e min are estimated from the residual
covariance matrix of the VECM and as:

 CI 2
)
 reg
2
 2 reg  e min i CI   e2min i reg

( e min i reg   reg
ISUB =

2
 reg
 e2min i

 CI2

(  2 )
 e min
ISLB = 2 2
2
 reg e min i  2 reg  e min i CI   e2min i reg
2
e min i

2
reg
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where the innovations are correlated and the subscripts UB and LB denote upper and lower
bounds, respectively.  e min i and  reg are defined as the common factor component of e-mini
futures and regular futures respectively,  reg is the standard deviation of regular futures,  e2min i is
the variance of e-mini futures and  CI is the Cholesky factorization value. According to Ballie et
al. (2002), the mean of the upper and lower bounds is a reasonable estimate of a market‟s
information share. A higher value of IS indicates a larger contribution from the regular contracts.

The standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test confirms that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root for the regular and e-mini futures price series. The Johansen (1991)
cointegration tests show that the regular and e-mini futures prices are cointegrated and hence
share a common stochastic trend.
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TABLE 3: Information Shares (IS)
The table represents information share for the sample period from January 2010 to December
2010. Panel A describes one second sampling mean, median and standard deviation estimates
relating to the information share (IS) of the regular and e-mini futures EUR/USD contract Panel
B shows weekly sampling mean median and standard deviation estimates for 52 weeks.
Information shares are computed from the vector error correction model (VECM) suggested by
Hasbrouck (1995).
Panel A
Regular contracts

Mean
Median
SD

Lower
Bound
0.394
0.463
0.063

E-mini contracts

Midpoint

Upper
bound

Lower
Bound

Midpoint

Upper
bound

0.665
0.728
0.208

0.935
0.993
0.353

0.188
0.264
0.072

0.334
0.414
0.192

0.479
0.563
0.311

Panel B
Regular contracts

Mean
Median
SD

E-mini contracts

Lower
Bound

Midpoint

Upper
bound

Lower
Bound

Midpoint

Upper
bound

0.345
0.459
0.052

0.619
0.707
0.201

0.892
0.954
0.349

0.172
0.248
0.065

0.328
0.376
0.185

0.484
0.504
0.304

Following the standard practice, Panel A of Table 3 describes one second sampling mean,
median and standard deviation estimates relating to the information share (IS) of the regular and
e-mini futures EUR/USD contracts. The lower and upper bounds do not provide a single measure
of IS. However Ballie et al. (2002), Booth, Lin, Martikainen and Tse (2002) and many others
propose that the mean of the upper and lower bounds is a reasonable estimate of a market‟s
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information share. Panel A shows that regular futures account for 66.5% contribution to price
discovery where as e-mini futures contribute 33.4% to price discovery. Panel B shows weekly
sampling mean median and standard deviation estimates. The results show that regular futures
account for 61.9% contribution to price discovery where as e-mini futures contribute 32.8% to
price discovery. The implication is that regular futures reflect information more efficiently
compared to e-mini futures for both the one second sampling interval and the weekly sampling
interval. The potential explanation is that a large body of literature indicates that the regular
futures markets have fewer constraints, higher leverage, lower transaction costs, and instruments
that make it easy to speculate and hedge which makes it an ideal market for informed investors.
These large investors are more likely to be institutional investors with greater financial, technical
and analytical skills. The finding may also not be surprising given the lower trading activity in
the e-mini futures market (Table 1) which is consistent with the notion that a more liquid market
is also more informative. Also according to Cabrera, Wang and Yang (2009), the trading in the
e-mini futures markets is concentrated among a few bankers and hence there might not be any
informed traders in this market.

A regression model, similar to one used by Klitgaard and Weir (2004) and Schwarz
(2011), is used to analyze how the positioning could affect contribution to price discovery.

ln[ IS k /(1  IS k )]  c  1 ln( NonCom)   2 ln(Com)   3 ln( Non Re p)  

where, ISt denotes the information share of the regular futures market calculated using the
weekly sampling interval on every Tuesday and c is a constant. ln( NonCom ) is the logarithm of
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the open positioning data for non-commercial traders, ln(Com) is the logarithm of the open
position for commercial traders and ln( Non Re p) is the logarithm of the open positioning data
for non-reportable (small) traders. The IS is constrained to the interval [0, 1]. I use log
transformation of IS = ln[ ISt /(1  ISt )]

TABLE 4: Effects of trader’s positions on information share using Hasbrouck (1995)
The table show the effects of trader‟s positions on information share (IS) where information
share of the regular futures is the dependent variable calculated using the weekly sampling
interval on every Tuesday and is measured by the Hasbrouck (1995) approach. Independent
variables are non-commercial, commercial trader and non-reportable type position. Ln denotes
logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The standard errors of the estimates are
computed based on the procedure of Newey-West (1987) to adjust for the presence of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression errors. The symbols ***, **, and *
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The regression model is specified as
follows:

ln[ IS k /(1 ________________________________________________________
IS k )]  c  1 ln( NonCom)   2 ln(Com)   3 ln( Non Re p)  
_____________
Dependent variable: the relative contribution to price discovery
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ln[ ISk /(1  ISk )]
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Variable

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Constant

4.736***
(0.000)

3.763***
(0.000)

3.635***
(0.000)

3.987***
(0.000)

2.764**
(0.014)
----

2.976**
(0.020)
0.635
(0.071)*
----

Noncom
Com
Non-rep

Adjusted R 2
Nos

3.874**
(0.010)
0.765*
(0.096)
1.763
(0.873)

---1.763
(0.852)
-2.763
(0.765)

0.386
52

0.127
52
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1.736
(0.693)

0.189
52

0.302
52

Table 4 reports the regression results of IS on the three trader types: non-commercial
traders (speculators), commercial traders (hedgers) and non-reportable traders (small traders).
The unrestricted model [1] includes all the three trader types as explanatory variables while the
restricted models [2, 3 and 4] include two of the three trader type variables. In model [1], the
logarithm of non-commercial traders is statistically significant at 5% level of significance and
logarithm of commercial trader type is significant at 10% level of significant. The coefficient of
non-reportable traders is not significant indicating that small traders have small and insignificant
impact on the regular futures information share. The slope coefficient of non-commercial traders
is higher than that of the commercial traders indicating that the IS of regular futures can be better
explained by non-commercial traders (speculators) than hedgers; specifically a 1% increase in
the trader type position of the non-commercial traders leads to an increase in the IS by 3.874%.
In the restricted models, the coefficient of non-commercial traders is positive and significant at
5% level of significance, whereas the coefficient of commercial traders is positive but
insignificant. Overall, the results suggest that speculator‟s trades have on average more
information content.

4.2. Common Factor Component Weight Approach

Let p t be a (n x 1) vector of I(1) price series for the same underlying security in n
markets. Each price series is non-stationary and correlated with h (h = n-1) cointergating
relations. The Granger representation theorem shows that the VAR(p) with cointergating
variables can be written in its error correction form

pt  Bz t*1  s1pt 1  s2 pt 2  .......  s p 1pt  p 1   t
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Stock and Watson (1988) show that the price vector can be decomposed into a permanent
and transitory component. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) proposed an alternative decomposition
of p t where the permanent component will be a function of the current values of p t . The vector
of price p t is decomposed as follows:

pt  F1 f t  F2 t
where f t is the common long memory component and  t is the stationary component. Two
conditions are imposed; first, f t is an exact linear function of the current values of p t and
second, the transitory component  t has no permanent effect on p t .

These assumptions make it possible to identify the common factor and also make the
common efficient price f t observable. The Gonzalo Granger approach defines the permanent
component of the vector of prices p t as a linear combination of the current values of the price
vector, where linear combination is given by the structure of the A. Given the nature of the
Gonzalo Granger decomposition and the following result:
f t  A ' pt

the A matrix becomes a natural measure of the contribution to price discovery of market i. The
higher the weight, the larger the contribution of the market to information.
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TABLE 5: Information share: Gonzalo – Granger weights
The table represents robustness check of information share for the sample period from January
2010 to December 2010. Panel A describes one second sampling mean, median and standard
deviation estimates relating to the information share (IS) of the regular and e-mini futures
EUR/USD contract Panel B shows weekly sampling mean median and standard deviation
estimates for 52 weeks. Information shares are computed from the vector error correction model
(VECM) suggested by Gonzalo – Granger (1995).

Panel A
Regular contract price

Mean
Median
SD

Lower
Bound
0.298
0.421
0.201

E-mini contract price

Midpoint

Upper
bound

Lower
Bound

Midpoint

Upper
bound

0.597
0.682
0.279

0.896
0.942
0.356

0.125
0.243
0.134

0.312
0.393
0.194

0.498
0.543
0.253

Panel B
Regular contract price

Mean
Median
SD

E-mini contract price

Lower
Bound

Midpoint

Upper
bound

Lower
Bound

Midpoint

Upper
bound

0.374
0.465
0.198

0.634
0.711
0.266

0.893
0.956
0.334

0.163
0.294
0.129

0.343
0.402
0.171

0.523
0.509
0.213

Table 5 shows the estimated price discovery contributions of the two markets; regular
and e-mini EUR/USD futures markets for both one second and weekly sampling intervals. In
Panel A, the common factor weights for one second interval, estimated jointly over all days by
the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) model is 59.7% for regular futures and 31.2% for e-mini
futures. Panel B presents weekly sampling interval and show that common factor weights for
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regular futures and e-mini futures is 63.4% and 34.3% respectively. This is similar to our initial
findings that the regular futures may better capture the IS as compared to e-mini futures.

TABLE 6: Effects of trader’s positions on information share using Gonzalo – Granger
(1995)
The table represents robustness check for the effects of trader‟s positions on information share
(IS) where information share of the regular futures is the dependent variable calculated using the
weekly sampling interval on every Tuesday and is measured by the Gonzalo – Granger (1995)
approach. Independent variables are non commercial, commercial and non-reportable trader type
position. Ln denotes logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The standard errors of
the estimates are computed based on the procedure of Newey-West (1987) to adjust for the
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the regression errors. The symbols ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The regression model is
specified as follows:
ln[ IS k /(1  IS k )]  c  1 ln( NonCom)   2 ln(Com)   3 ln( Non Re p)  
___________________________________________________________________
Dependent variable: the relative contribution to price discovery
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ln[ ISk /(1  ISk )]
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Variable

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Constant

3.635***
(0.000)
2.836**
(0.012)
0.236*
(0.085)
2.732
(0.873)

4.722***
(0.000)
----

3.635***
(0.000)
1.764**
(0.027)
----

3.983***
(0.000)
2.424**
(0.047)
1.042*
(0.057)
----

0.406
52

0.103
52

Non-com
Com
Non-rep

Adjusted R 2
Nos

-2.873
(0.927)
-2.763
(0.765)

2.872
(0.524)
0.195
52

0.293
52

Table 6 reports the regression results of IS calculated using the Gonzalo and Granger
(1995) method on the three trader types; non-commercial traders (speculators), commercial
traders (hedgers) and non-reportable traders (small traders). Here I find that the coefficient of
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non-commercial traders is positive and significant at 5% level of significance, indicating that a
1% increase in the non-commercial trader type position will lead to a 2.84% increase in IS value
of the regular futures contracts. The coefficient of commercial traders is also positive but not
significant collaborating with the finding that that the IS of regular futures can be better
explained by non-commercial traders (speculators) than hedgers.
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5. CONCLUSION

This study investigates the relative contribution by the regular futures market and e-mini
futures market to price discovery in EURO/USD futures market using high frequency data in
2010. The relative contribution to price discovery is estimated using the information share
approach of Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). The primary results indicate
that regular futures market dominates price discovery visa vie e-mini futures market. On average,
regular futures contributes 66.5% to price discovery in the EURO/USD futures market.

This study also studies the relationship between positioning of different types of participants
(hedgers and speculators) and IS. Both restricted and unrestricted regressions are considered. I
find a positive significant relationship between IS and the non-commercial (speculators) trader
position and between IS and commercial (hedgers) trader position. The slope coefficient of noncommercial trader type is higher relative to the commercial trader type indicating that the IS of
regular futures can be better explained by non-commercial traders (speculators) than hedgers.
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APPENDIX “A”
VARIABLES

DISCRIPTION

Open Interest

Open interest is the total of all futures and/or option contracts entered
into and not yet offset by a transaction, by delivery, by exercise, etc. The
aggregate of all long open interest is equal to the aggregate of all short
open interest.

Reportable Positions

Commercial and
Non-commercial
Traders

Open interest held or controlled by a trader is referred to as that trader's
position. For the COT Futures-and-Options-Combined report, option
open interest and traders' option positions are computed on a futuresequivalent basis using delta factors supplied by the exchanges. Long-call
and short-put open interest are converted to long futures-equivalent open
interest. Likewise, short-call and long-put open interest are converted to
short futures-equivalent open interest. For example, a trader holding a
long put position of 500 contracts with a delta factor of 0.50 is
considered to be holding a short futures-equivalent position of 250
contracts. A trader's long and short futures-equivalent positions are
added to the trader's long and short futures positions to give "combinedlong" and "combined-short" positions. Open interest, as reported to the
Commission and as used in the COT report, does not include open
futures contracts against which notices of deliveries have been stopped
by a trader or issued by the clearing organization of an exchange
Clearing members, futures commission merchants, and foreign brokers
(collectively called reporting firms) file daily reports with the
Commission. Those reports show the futures and option positions of
traders that hold positions above specific reporting levels set by CFTC
regulations. If, at the daily market close, a reporting firm has a trader
with a position at or above the Commission‟s reporting level in any
single futures month or option expiration, it reports that trader‟s entire
position in all futures and options expiration months in that commodity,
regardless of size. The aggregate of all traders‟ positions reported to the
Commission usually represents 70 to 90 percent of the total open
interest in any given market. From time to time, the Commission will
raise or lower the reporting levels in specific markets to strike a balance
between collecting sufficient information to oversee the markets and
minimizing the reporting burden on the futures industry.
When an individual reportable trader is identified to the Commission,
the trader is classified either as "commercial" or "non-commercial." All
of a trader's reported futures positions in a commodity are classified as
commercial if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular
commodity for hedging as defined in CFTC Regulation 1.3(z), 17 CFR
1.3(z). A trading entity generally gets classified as a "commercial"
trader by filing a statement with the Commission, on CFTC Form 40:
Statement of Reporting Trader, that it is commercially "...engaged in
business activities hedged by the use of the futures or option markets."
To ensure that traders are classified with accuracy and consistency,
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Non-reportable
Positions

Spreading

Changes in
Commitments from
Previous Reports
Percent of Open
Interest

Number of Traders

Old and Other
Futures

Commission staff may exercise judgment in re-classifying a trader if it
has additional information about the trader‟s use of the markets. A trader
may be classified as a commercial trader in some commodities and as a
non-commercial trader in other commodities. A single trading entity
cannot be classified as both a commercial and non-commercial trader in
the same commodity. Nonetheless, a multi-functional organization that
has more than one trading entity may have each trading entity classified
separately in a commodity. For example, a financial organization trading
in financial futures may have a banking entity whose positions are
classified as commercial and have a separate money-management entity
whose positions are classified as non-commercial.
The long and short open interest shown as "Non-reportable Positions" is
derived by subtracting total long and short "Reportable Positions" from
the total open interest. Accordingly, for "Non-reportable Positions," the
number of traders involved and the commercial/non-commercial
classification of each trader are unknown
For the futures-only report, spreading measures the extent to which each
non-commercial trader holds equal long and short futures positions. For
the options-and-futures-combined report, spreading measures the extent
to which each non-commercial trader holds equal combined-long and
combined-short positions. For example, if a non-commercial trader in
Eurodollar futures holds 2,000 long contracts and 1,500 short contracts,
500 contracts will appear in the "Long" category and 1,500 contracts
will appear in the "Spreading" category. These figures do not include
intermarket spreading, such as spreading Eurodollar futures against
Treasury Note futures. Also see the "Old and Other Futures" section,
below.
Changes represent the differences between the data for the current report
date and the data published in the previous report.
Percents are calculated against the total open interest for the futures-only
report and against the total futures-equivalent open interest for the
options-and-futures-combined report. Percents less than 0.05 are shown
as 0.0; and because of rounding, percents may not total 100%
To determine the total number of reportable traders in a market, a trader
is counted only once whether or not the trader appears in more than one
category (non-commercial traders may be long or short only and may be
spreading; commercial traders may be long and short). To determine the
number of traders in each category, however, a trader is counted in each
category in which the trader holds a position. The sum of the numbers of
traders in each category, therefore, will often exceed the number of
traders in that market
For selected commodities where there is a well-defined marketing
season or crop year, the COT data are broken down by "old" and "other"
crop years. The "Major Markets for Which the COT Data Is Shown by
Crop Year" table (shown below) lists those commodities and the first
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and last futures of the marketing season or crop year. In order not to
disclose positions in a single future near its expiration, on the first
business day of the month of the last future in an "old" crop year, the
data for that last future is combined with the data for the next crop year
and is shown as "old" crop futures. An example is CBOT wheat, where
the first month of the crop year is July and the last month of the prior
crop year is May. On May 3, 2004, positions in the May 2004 futures
month were aggregated with positions in the July 2004 through May
2005 futures months and shown as "old" crop futures. Positions in all
subsequent wheat futures months were shown as "other."

Concentration Ratios

For the "old" and "other" figures, spreading is calculated for equal long
and short positions within a crop year. If a non-commercial trader holds
a long position in an "old" crop-year future and an equal short position
in an "other" crop-year future, the long position will be classified as
"long-only" in the "old" crop year and the short position will be
classified as "short-only" in the "other" crop year. In this example, in the
"all" category, which considers each trader's positions without regard to
crop year, that trader's positions will be classified as "spreading." For
this reason, summing the "old" and "other" figures for long-only, for
short-only, or for spreading will not necessarily equal the corresponding
figure shown for "all" futures. Any differences result from traders that
spread from an "old" crop-year future to an "other" crop-year future
The report shows the percents of open interest held by the largest four
and eight reportable traders, without regard to whether they are
classified as commercial or non-commercial. The concentration ratios
are shown with trader positions computed on a gross long and gross
short basis and on a net long or net short basis. The "Net Position" ratios
are computed after offsetting each trader‟s equal long and short
positions. A reportable trader with relatively large, balanced long and
short positions in a single market, therefore, may be among the four and
eight largest traders in both the gross long and gross short categories,
but will probably not be included among the four and eight largest
traders on a net basis

SOURCE – U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) explanatory notes
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